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Excerpt from Dynamics of International Relations, by Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, 1956.

Dynamics of International Relations, by Ernst B. Haas (U. of California [Berkeley]) and Allen S. Whiting (Michigan State U.), 1956 the McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., New York.

p. 326
The Sharpening of Conflict. In both Europe and Asia, Soviet tactics successfully freed the hands of Germany and Japan so as to precipitate war between them and other capitalist powers, simultaneously safeguarding the Soviet center and permitting extension of Russian power. Concise statement of these tactics came in secret telegrams explaining policy to the Soviet ambassador to Japan in 1940.28 Moscow explained its acceptance of Japanese conciliatory moves along the Manchurian border:
...Japan plans intensifying pressure on foreign interests in China and Southeast Asia by securing the safety of Manchuria. We considered that this action on part of Japan would collide with foreign nations to advantage of the Soviet Union and China. We may alleviate our pressure upon North Manchuria border if Japan lifts her pressure upon Soviet Russia and China...
A second wire clarified this policy:
...An overall agreement with Japan including peace between Japan and China would spoil Soviet-American relations. Considering a probable Soviet-German dispute in the future, we do not desire the cooling of friendly relations with America. Also such overall agreement with Japan might destroy our work proceeding among the suppressed peoples of Asia, and it would, on the one hand, guarantee Japan's free activities in China and in the Pacific, and on the other, it would not instigate the Japanese-American war which we desire. So we are planning not to develop the negotiation into an agreement but merely to alleviate tension between Japan and the Soviet Union. We concluded an "Agreement with Germany" because a war is required in Europe...
28These telegrams were intercepted by the Imperial Japanese Government's consul general in Harbin. Japanese copies were examined by A.S. Whiting and accepted as authentic.
See also Wohlstetter.

Excerpt from Armed Truce, The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46, by Hugh Thomas, 1986.

Armed Truce, The Beginnings of the Cold War 1945-46, by Hugh Thomas, © 1986 Hugh Thomas, Sceptre edition 1988, Hodder and Stoughton Ltd., London.

p. 115
Still, occasional intercepted telegrams between the Soviet commissariat for foreign affairs and embassies abroad which have become available suggest that the former at least never allowed sentiment to prevent candour. Thus a telegram from Molotov to Tokyo in 1940 spoke of the "Japanese-American war, which we desire"; and blandly commented 'a war is required in Europe'. 81
p. 811
81 Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York 1956), 326. These telegrams were intercepted by the Japanese Government's consul in Harbin, 'we concluded an Agreement with Germany because a war is required in Europe', the telegram concludes.

On the Hamish Hamilton, London, edition of 1986 the items above are respectively at pp. 66 and 581. The same goes for the Atheneum, New York, edition of 1987.

Praise for Armed Truce:

"A profoundly brilliant and illuminating book. When you read it, the world begins at last to make sense, and its pieces to fall into place."

Midge Decter

"Armed Truce is a brilliantly incisive analysis, vivid in portraiture, always informative, always readable - a distinguished historian's masterful account of the beginnings of the Cold War."

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

"A splendid overview of the origins and surfacing of the Cold War."

Zbigniew Brzezinski