

Exchange S.S. GRIPSHOLM
August 14, 1942

Dear Mr. President:

There is respectfully appended for your own information a copy of my final political report from Tokyo covering the period immediately prior to the outbreak of war between the United States and Japan. The report is of course addressed to the Secretary of State, but I think that you will wish to examine it because it will presumably be carefully weighed by future historians as contemporary evidence bearing on the question as to whether, compatible with our national interests and without sacrificing any point of principle, war with Japan could have been avoided.

As history is properly based on contemporary evidence I feel in duty bound accurately to assemble and present the evidence on this subject, a subject of transcendent importance to our nation, as it emerged in Tokyo.

To

The President,
The White House,
Washington.

To state the matter briefly, Japan during the summer and autumn of 1941 found herself in an increasingly precarious position, economically and in other respects, as a result of our economic measures against her and as a result of the impact of other developments abroad. In fact, our freezing order and other measures had created precisely the situation which they were intended to create.

Prince Konoye in August and September of 1941 for the first time began to see the handwriting on the wall. He realized that his country was heading for disaster, that its economic situation was steadily deteriorating, and that its accumulated stocks of matériel were progressively and dangerously decreasing -- chiefly as a result of our economic measures. The situation called for fundamental treatment. Prince Konoye bore the heavy responsibility for Japan's aggressive policy and action over the past years, including the invasion of China in 1937, but he was the only Japanese statesman capable of reversing the engine, and this, prompted by dire necessity, he did his best to accomplish.

Two alternative courses were then available to Japan: the pursuance of a course of peace, involving settlements both with the United States and with China; or a program of war, aimed at conquering and controlling the entire area of Greater East Asia including the

South Seas, which had long been the aim of the Japanese extremists. But the waging of a successful war against the unlimited power of the United States was at best problematical.

Prince Konoye chose to follow a program of peace, and in this policy he was supported not only by the Emperor, who had actually instructed the chiefs of the Army and Navy that they were to avoid war with the United States and Great Britain, but also by all the other members of his Government including the highest responsible officers of the military and naval commands. With this support Prince Konoye was convinced, and I so informed our Government, that the military hot-heads and other extremists in the country could and would be controlled if he could come to an agreement with the United States at that moment, before the opposition of those extremist elements, urged on by the Germans, had sufficiently organized to overturn his Government and torpedo the conversations. Time was of the essence.

For the first time in ten years, in fact for the first time since the invasion of Manchuria, the policy of the American Government had created in Japan a soil fertile for the sowing of new seeds, and it was of the utmost importance for the avoidance of ultimate war that those seeds should be sown with the wisdom of the

highest

highest statesmanship. The opportunity was then presented to turn the trend in Japan and the thoughts of the Japanese people from war to peace.

Prince Konoye was pinning all his faith on his proposed meeting with you in Alaska and he had told me with unquestionable sincerity that he was prepared at that meeting to accept the American terms whatever they might be. In fact, Mr. Hirota, former Prime Minister, who was in close touch with and carried important influence in military and political circles, said (not to me but to others) that Prince Konoye could not possibly afford to allow the proposed meeting to result in failure. Mr. Hirota added that this meant that Prince Konoye would unquestionably have to accept your terms, and that under the existing circumstances he could and would carry the entire Japanese nation, including the military, with him. No statesman in Japan was in a better position than Mr. Hirota to gauge the situation, but the same opinions were held and expressed to me by other influential Japanese at that time.

What was needed at that moment was a dramatic gesture to sway both the Japanese and the American people, a gesture which, it is believed, would have been afforded had the proposed meeting taken place. On returning from Juneau, Prince Konoye would have been able to announce to the Japanese people that he had succeeded in assuring

to them without further force of arms a prosperous future, with access to raw materials, a free flow of trade and commerce, financial support, and the negotiation of a new treaty with the United States. Simultaneously, the American people could have been informed that your negotiations with Prince Konoye had been successful in achieving the fundamental desiderata of the United States without recourse to war.

It was clearly understood and admitted in Japan that the proposed agreement would inevitably entail the withdrawal of all Japanese troops from French Indochina and China as fast as they could practicably be withdrawn, with the mere face-saving expedient of leaving garrisons in Mongolia and North China, which in fact was what other nations had done up to that time. As a result of such an agreement, too, Japan's adherence to the Axis, even although it could not have been immediately and overtly disavowed, would automatically have become a dead letter and Japan unquestionably would have been separated from the German camp. The Germans had, as usual, been overplaying their hand in Japan and the Japanese people, including many of their highest statesmen, were not happy in the Axis. Several of those statesmen admitted to me their realization that separation from the Axis would have to come about if an agreement with the United States were to be consummated.

Obviously

Obviously our Government would have entered into no commitment to interrupt our aid to Chiang Kai-shek until Japan had proved beyond peradventure her intention and ability to implement her own commitments in good faith. We held the leverage imposed by our economic measures and would certainly have retained that leverage until convinced that Prince Konoye would and could honor his undertakings.

The quibbling between our two Governments over formulas was in no respect a criterion of what Prince Konoye and his associates would have been willing to do, provided the meeting with you had taken place. I told the Department that this problem could never be solved by formulas for the reason that the Japanese Government was constantly afraid of written records which would have inevitably come to the attention of the political and military extremists in the country with the result that the Government might fall either through overthrow or assassinations before it had accomplished its aim. I felt all along, and so informed our Government, that this problem was far above any question of formulas, and that once the meeting between you and Prince Konoye had taken place, the results would have swept the Japanese people off their feet, overwhelming the military extremists, and would have been greeted by the Japanese people with deep satisfaction and profound relief, for they would have

secured their future welfare by peace instead of war. I still believe this today and I believe that history, when the contemporary evidence is set forth and duly weighed, will confirm this belief.

This whole situation is elaborated in the appended report and I have tried so far as possible to meet the various objections to my presentation which will undoubtedly be raised at home, especially the objection that any agreement between the United States and Japan would have resulted in "selling China down the river". I believe, on the contrary, that the sort of agreement which was visualized and which I was convinced was practicable and capable of implementation would have resulted in the greatest possible benefit to China, who would thereby have achieved most of her desiderata at once and all of her desiderata later.

I have made it clear throughout my report that I am approaching this matter only from the point of view of the Embassy in Tokyo and that on returning home I shall no doubt learn of other factors entering into the situation of which I was kept in ignorance. Yet certain questions have inevitably bewildered me, and I hope in due course to learn the answers. I venture to mention only three of them here, as follows.

On August 28, according to the records, you informed Admiral Nomura that "the Ambassador might state to his Government that the President was very optimistic as he regarded

regarded the latest communication from the Japanese Government as a step in advance" and that you "looked forward with real interest to the possibility of conferring for several days with the Japanese Prime Minister". This conversation occurred a full month after Japan's agreement with Vichy and the occupation by Japanese armed forces of bases in French Indochina. Yet from that moment no further indication of any encouragement whatsoever to Prince Konoye with regard to the proposed meeting emerged in the records of the Washington conversations. Could this have been due merely to the quibbling over formulas and the progressive or regressive sway of the tide in the futile conversations? Was the transcendent importance to our country of preserving peace to depend on the utterly futile effort to find mutually satisfactory formulas? It seemed to me, and it still seems to me, that something much bigger than formulas should and could have swayed the issue. It is my belief that the United States had everything to gain and nothing to lose by accepting Prince Konoye's unqualified assurance to me, corroborated by others among the highest statesmen in Japan, that he would and could bring his country to meet whatever requirements you might lay down at the proposed meeting with him, and into assured channels of peace instead of war.

I also could not understand why one of my most important recommendations to you, contained in my telegram No. 1355, August 30, 6 p.m., was ignored or at least not acted upon. The Japanese people had never been directly told of the great advantages to them which would accrue from an agreement with the United States. Although such advantages had occasionally been touched upon in public utterances in Washington, these utterances had never been allowed to reach the Japanese people through the Japanese press. They had been told and they believed that the United States was actuated purely by selfish, materialistic and imperialistic ambitions and that the whole aim of the United States in the Far East was to drive Japan to the wall economically and in every other way, so that the United States alone would control the raw materials available in that region and would deprive Japan even of her legitimate sources of livelihood. This was the picture that was constantly drilled into the Japanese people by Axis propaganda and these arguments had never been effectively met in any public statements by responsible American statesmen published in Japan. I had constantly tried to meet those arguments in my own statements in Japan, but what was needed was a categorical presentation of the American position and attitude by the President of the United States. I recommended that in your Labor Day speech
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or, if that were not feasible, in a subsequent speech, you should present a clear conception of the concrete advantages which such a settlement with the United States upon the basis of Mr. Hull's four principles would bring to Japan, dwelling upon the future rather than upon the past or present and omitting comment which could be used against us by Axis propaganda. I would have taken steps, and I so reported, to have your speech published in the Japanese press and thus brought forcibly to the attention of the Japanese people. It would have immeasurably strengthened Prince Konoye's hand at a moment when he terribly needed strengthening and it would have gone very far to counteract the insidious German propaganda which constantly flooded the Japanese press. It might well have turned, and probably would have turned, the whole tide of thought in Japan at this critical moment. I was not told why my recommendation was not carried out.

One further question leaves me still in bewildered ignorance. In the late summer and early autumn of 1941 Prince Konoye and Admiral Toyoda continually begged that our Government should set forth to them confidentially a clear and comprehensive conception or statement of the requirements which our Government considered essential to an agreement between Japan and the United States,

and

and I continually urged in my telegrams that this be done. I am aware that our Government was reluctant to state its full conditions, except as those conditions appeared in the drafts and counter-drafts of formulas presented in the course of the Washington conversations. Yet the failure of our Government to do so, in the face of Prince Konoye's invitation to do so, coupled with his categorical assurance to me that at his meeting with you he would fully accept and meet those conditions, inevitably conveyed to him and his associates the unfortunate impression that our Government was merely playing for time and had no real intention to come to an agreement with Japan. It was this impression which finally brought about the fall of Prince Konoye's Cabinet. Our Government's conditions were finally and succinctly presented to the Tojo Government in our draft proposal of November 26; the draft was labeled as a basis for discussion, but coming when it did long after the fall of Prince Konoye's Government and at a time when the extremist opposition to any agreement with the United States which had been constantly developed and strengthened by the insidious machinations of the Germans had become powerfully organized, the draft was interpreted in Japan as an ultimatum and war rapidly ensued. I do not yet know the basic reasons for what appeared to us in the Embassy this egregious error in timing.

Whether

Whether the Tojo Government had any real intention or hope of coming to an agreement with us or whether the conversations were continued merely for the purpose of lulling us into a false sense of security, is an open question which probably will not be answered in our time. My own belief, although this can only be a matter of speculation, is that war, while all the plans had been long prepared, was definitely determined upon only after the receipt of the memorandum of November 26.

There are some things which can be sensed by the man on the spot which cannot be sensed by those at a distance, and I am completely convinced that my reports as to what the Japanese Government was prepared to do and was able to do and would have done had the meeting between yourself and Prince Konoye taken place were fundamentally accurate and sound. It seems to me pertinent to add that, even if my observations and judgment had not been sound and even if, despite my belief, the Japanese Government had found it impossible to implement any agreement reached with the Government of the United States, the longer war between the two countries could have been postponed the more it would have been to the advantage of our vital national interests. There was, in my opinion, no possibility that the Japanese Government could have jockeyed us into a less favorable position than we were in when the meeting between you and Prince Konoye might have taken place, for we would certainly have


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have relaxed our own economic measures against Japan only gradually and pari passu with Japan's loyal implementation of such commitments as she might undertake. The leverage would have remained constantly in our hands.

Obviously the appended report cannot be published until after the war is over, and you may be sure that my own loyalty to you, to our Government, and to our country will prevent my publicly saying or writing any word which could be interpreted by the American people as indicating any difference of opinion between the Administration and myself. Our job is now clean-cut before us, namely, to bring about the complete defeat of Japan, for only by such a defeat can her military caste and system be liquidated. There is not room in the Pacific area for a peaceful America and a swash-buckling Japan. I hope that I may be allowed to contribute my utmost endeavor, in whatever way you may find best, to the prosecution of the war.

I am, my dear Mr. President,

Respectfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Joseph P. Kamp". The signature is written in dark ink and extends across the width of the page, ending in a long, sweeping tail that curves downwards and to the right.