-2- Memorandum (cont'd.) 5. In the early seventies when I started to research Pearl Harbor and the role played by the Department of State's Division of Far Eastern Affairs, this last sentence gained great significance, especially as I read Mr. Grew's testimony when he appeared before several investigative bodies. Navy and Army intelligence officers who, up to the end of the thirties, depended almost wholly on State Department briefings for their political intelligence regarding Japan, had "eyes only" access to "top secret" and "classified" despatches. This meant they had to rely on their memories for reports to their superiors. See Ex. 4, Lt. Comdr. McCollum's report to his superiors. Note the significant words, places no credence. "The Division of Naval Intelligence[s] places no credence in these rumors." In the manner of the operation of bureaucracies, this particular intelligence report was passed up along the hierarchy to the Office of Naval Intelligence and subsequently to the Secretary of the Navy. See Note at bottom of page 3 here. 6. In the military all messages are called dispatches. In the Department of State, at least at that time, a telegram was clearly identified at the top of the page with the words in bold letters, TELEGRAM RECEIVED and/or TELEGRAM SENT. See Ex. 1. In State, also at the time, diplomatic despatches (always and strictly with an e) generally came by diplomatic courier by air, or by ship if it was not an urgent message. A despatch was always on legal size paper with its number and subject clearly stated at the top of the first page. It is obvious that the exhibit Mr. Grew allowed his interrogators to refer to as a dispatch was not that. 7. At no time, when Ambassador Grew appeared before any of the investigative bodies which called on him to testify, did he reveal that there actually had been two messages, namely, a telegram and subsequently, a despatch. The latter is customary and amplifies the information sent previously in telegram. Of course, the fact that Mr. Grew, in his despatch gave Mr. Schreiber's intelligence information a "no credence" evaluation was critical. It was to his advantage, therefore, not to clarify the fact that a differ- ence between these two messages insofar as State Department practice was concerned. Luckily, having found a way_out of what might have been incriminating, not only for himself but as well for his colleagues in the State Department who had unquestioningly carried out his policy, Mr. Grew continued the charade throughout his testimony.