-2-
Memorandum (cont'd.)
5. In the early seventies when I started to research Pearl
Harbor and the role played by the Department of State's
Division of Far Eastern Affairs, this last sentence gained
great significance, especially as I read Mr. Grew's
testimony when he appeared before several investigative
bodies. Navy and Army intelligence officers who, up to
the end of the thirties, depended almost wholly on State
Department briefings for their political intelligence
regarding Japan, had "eyes only" access to "top secret"
and "classified" despatches. This meant they had to rely
on their memories for reports to their superiors. See
Ex. 4, Lt. Comdr. McCollum's report to his superiors. Note
the significant words, places no credence.
"The Division of Naval Intelligence[s] places no
credence in these rumors."
In the manner of the operation of bureaucracies, this
particular intelligence report was passed up along the
hierarchy to the Office of Naval Intelligence and
subsequently to the Secretary of the Navy. See Note at bottom of
page 3 here.
6. In the military all messages are called dispatches. In
the Department of State, at least at that time, a telegram
was clearly identified at the top of the page with the
words in bold letters, TELEGRAM RECEIVED and/or TELEGRAM
SENT. See Ex. 1. In State, also at the time, diplomatic
despatches (always and strictly with an e) generally came
by diplomatic courier by air, or by ship if it was not an
urgent message. A despatch was always on legal size paper
with its number and subject clearly stated at the top of
the first page. It is obvious that the exhibit Mr. Grew
allowed his interrogators to refer to as a dispatch was not
that.
7. At no time, when Ambassador Grew appeared before any of the
investigative bodies which called on him to testify, did he
reveal that there actually had been two messages, namely,
a telegram and subsequently, a despatch. The latter is
customary and amplifies the information sent previously in
telegram. Of course, the fact that Mr. Grew, in his
despatch gave Mr. Schreiber's intelligence information a
"no credence" evaluation was critical. It was to his
advantage, therefore, not to clarify the fact that a differ-
ence between these two messages insofar as State Department
practice was concerned. Luckily, having found a way_out
of what might have been incriminating, not only for himself
but as well for his colleagues in the State Department
who had unquestioningly carried out his policy, Mr. Grew
continued the charade throughout his testimony.